4.3 The security situation in Nigeria
When TT arrived in Lagos in July 2016, the security situation in Nigeria was characterized by a conflict between the authorities and the terrorist group Boko Haram that had already lasted for several years. The ship owner and the insurer agreed that the situation could be described as “war” according to political science definitions. Boko Haram had taken control over a significant area in the north east parts of Nigeria, as well as bordering areas in neighboring countries. The Nigerian authority, however, won most of the occupied land back in a successful counter attack against the group in 2014-2015. As a result, Boko Haram went into hiding and started “terror bombing” using so-called “Improvised Explosive Devices” (IED) against institutions, the military and civilians. The bombings were intensive, represented a serious security problem and had a destabilizing effect on society. It was therefore an important goal for the authorities to hinder Boko Haram from getting hold of material for the bombs. The political effort to control Boko Haram was intensified after the presidential election in 2015, where i.a. the national security advisor (NSA) was changed and his agency (ONSA) was strengthened.(1)The arbitration award (n 1) 2-3.
The tribunal referred to a series of documents starting from 13 August 2015 that demonstrated how important it was for the Nigerian authorities to prevent Boko Haram from having access to raw material for making bombs.(2)The arbitration award (n 1) 12-14.The main aim was to prevent Boko Haram from stealing urea from different storage facilities in Nigeria in order to make bombs. Among the proactive measures taken to prevent this was the suspension of the “issuance of EUC for importation of Urea Fertilizer”, “discourage the local manufacture, distribution and sale of Urea Fertilizer in the country”, as well as identifying fertilizers that cannot be used as raw material for bombs.(3)Letter from ONSA to several civilian and military institutions (13 August 2015).Another measure was a temporary embargo on importation of Urea and Potassium Nitrate Fertilizers.(4)Minutes from meeting between ONSA and representatives for public institutions and representatives for the fertilizer producers 18 November 2015, dated 3 December 2015).This embargo was sustained by the NSA and stopped the Nigerian company Notore Chemical Industries Ltd (Notore) from obtaining permits to import Urea Formaldehyde.(5)Letter from Department of agriculture (NAFDAC) to Notore Chemical Industries Ltd (13 January 2016).The temporary prohibition on the import of urea was continued through January and February 2016, even though the authorities also acknowledged that import of urea was necessary for Nigerian food supply. It was also emphasized that the prohibition was necessary to prevent urea from going astray.(6)Letters from ONSA to the minister of agriculture (29 January 2016 and 16 February 2016); letters from ONSA to i.a. NAFDAC (26 February 2016 and 3 March 2016).
The minister of agriculture (NAFDAC) decided in March 2016 that only two named companies should be allowed to import and produce urea fertilizer. This would ease control and perhaps also protect local companies.(7)Letter from NAFDAC to ONSA (3 March 2015).The decision was upheld in August 2016,(8)Meeting with fertilizer producers (4 August 2016).where the NSA described the increasing use of IED by terrorists and urea as a raw material for these bombs, and that free import of urea resulted in a lack of control and eased access to the urea for illegal purposes. Free import also created difficulties for local producers as well as having a negative impact arising from the use of foreign currency.
The arbitration tribunal concluded that even if protection of local production may have been an issue, the measures concerning urea were mainly explained by political considerations of security, and that it was a key goal to prevent Boko Haram from having access to urea for making IEDs.